CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.678
19 May 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 May 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. György Boytha (Hungary)

GE.94-61490 (E)

The PRESIDENT: After our inter-sessional period, I have the honour to declare open the 678th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish, on behalf of the Conference, to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham, who is the first speaker on our list today. As you are aware, the Minister has already addressed the Conference on two previous occasions and his presence among us today testifies to the continued interest of New Zealand in our work.

I also have on the list of speakers for today the representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

I give the floor to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand): It is an honour for me to address the Conference on Disarmament at the opening of the second part of its 1994 session.

When I last addressed this body in January 1993, after attending the chemical weapons Convention signing ceremony in Paris, I commented that, that achievement notwithstanding, the Conference could not afford to rest on its laurels. It seemed to me then that the CD must take advantage of changes in the international situation and pursue with vigour those items on its agenda of fundamental importance to many of us.

By and large, these changes have been beneficial, tilting the balance from totalitarianism to democracy, from confrontation to cooperation. There have been dramatic improvements in States' assessments of their own security and, consequently, new opportunities for progress in disarmament and arms control.

But there is no doubt that there remain some formidable challenges to peace and stability, including in the Asia-Pacific region in which New Zealanders live. Perhaps the most pervasive security concern in the post-cold-war era is the heightened threat of unrestrained arms flows and the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Efforts to achieve the total elimination of chemical and biological weapons, and substantial reductions of conventional weapons, must continue alongside those to secure progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Today, it is very clear that the Conference is, in fact responding to these challenges and has entered a new and important phase of activity. New Zealand welcomes the renewed focus on the nuclear items on its agenda, which are of undiminished relevance. Not only are the negotiations on a CTBT well under way. The Conference has before it the results of the Special Coordinator's views on the "where" and "how" of a cut-off treaty. And there is the prospect of new activity in the important area of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. It is on these subjects that I wish to comment today.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

In doing so, I note that the Conference has very recently heard New Zealand's views on the vital question of conventional arms control, including transparency measures which aim to build confidence and enhance the security of States at the regional and international level. We shall join other States parties in efforts to strengthen the biological weapons Convention through consideration later this year of measures to verify compliance with this treaty. In the lead-up to the review of the inhumane weapons Convention, we shall also be seeking ways to enhance controls over the production, transfer and use of land-mines which have had a devastating impact, in human and economic terms, in every region of the world.

During a period of more than 30 years, a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing has become almost the Holy Grail of multilateral disarmament. New Zealand's efforts to promote a halt to nuclear testing by all States, in all environments, for all time, are well known. It had long been our belief that the CD has responsibility for negotiating a treaty to secure that objective.

The decision of the Conference in August last year to begin negotiations in 1994 on item 1 of its agenda was therefore greeted with much enthusiasm in New Zealand. The determination of the international community to support this process, vividly conveyed by the passage in the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly of the first consensus resolution on the subject, has not diminished. Indeed, expectations remain high.

New Zealand wants an effective CTBT concluded in rapid time. We believe that this is an entirely realistic goal given the encouraging progress made during the first part of this session under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, and the working group chairmen. We are also aware that nearly half of the Conference's meeting time this year is already behind us. In the coming months New Zealand will therefore be working with others to ensure that no time is wasted in putting together a text which meets the desire of the international community for a treaty which provides for a universal, multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test ban.

I am aware that the design and costing of an effective verification regime is a priority in this regard. I am therefore pleased to be able to confirm that New Zealand's contribution to the elaboration of the seismic core of the treaty's verification package, through our long-time participation in the GSE, is being complemented by a contribution to this week's expert sessions from our experts in the field of radioactivity monitoring, drawing on the experience we have gained in our own region, the South Pacific.

It will be important in the coming months to ensure the best possible atmosphere for these negotiations. New Zealand believes that the nuclear-weapon States can demonstrate their commitment to progress by refraining from further testing. It is pleasing to note recent reaffirmations of that commitment.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Another measure of the new momentum in the CD this year is the appointment of a Special Coordinator, Canadian Ambassador Gerry Shannon, to conduct consultations on how and where the negotiation of a convention banning the manufacture of fissionable material for weapons purposes could take place. His recent report to the Conference lays the foundation for negotiations. New Zealand shares the view that the early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and effectively verifiable fissile material production ban will be of particular importance in the context of non-proliferation.

There is also a need to respond to international concern about the release of highly enriched uranium and of plutonium as a consequence of the process of nuclear disarmament. Our view is that a ban on further reproduction should be complemented by reliable and transparent mechanisms to manage existing stocks.

At the global level the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty continues to play a crucial role as the primary bulwark against the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is also the framework for facilitating and regulating cooperation among States in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In our view the treaty should continue in force indefinitely after 1995. Attempting to use the treaty's extension as a lever to achieve concessions in other arms control areas, however well intended, is playing with stakes that are simply too high. The NPT is a key factor in the security of us all. It is too important to bargain away. By indefinite extension the international community will send to would-be proliferators the clearest possible signal that their activities are not acceptable.

While it is clear that with 163 parties the NPT is the most successful disarmament treaty ever, it is equally important that efforts continue to promote wider adherence so that the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime enjoys universal support. Indeed, with the welcome announcements by Argentina and Algeria of their intention to accede to the NPT before the 1994 Conference, we are a step closer to achieving this goal.

In this regard, New Zealand also welcomes recent accessions by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Georgia as non-nuclear-weapon States. We are pleased to note the commencement of the transfer of nuclear weapons from the Ukraine to the Russian Federation in accordance with the trilateral agreement reached in January between the United States, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. It is our hope that the Ukraine will very soon become a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT in fulfilment of its commitments under the Lisbon Protocol.

Full compliance with the NPT and nuclear safeguards agreements is essential to the functioning and strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime. New Zealand looks to the DPRK to meet its safeguards obligations and allay regional and international concern regarding its nuclear programme. We continue to support dialogue as the most desirable approach to resolving this problem, though the international community cannot afford to compromise on the ultimate requirement of adequate IAEA inspections of North Korean nuclear

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

facilities. Satisfactory resolution of the issue will open the way to more normal and beneficial relations between North Korea and the countries of the region, something which my Government would support.

Before I leave this subject, let me also say that the generally improved international situation, qualified by the potential threat of proliferation, argues emphatically for the relevance of regional measures such as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. We congratulate all those concerned on the progress made towards the conclusion of the drafting of a treaty to create an African nuclear-weapons-free zone. We are equally encouraged by continued progress towards the entry into force for the entire Latin American and Caribbean region of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the accession to its Protocol II of all five nuclear-weapon States. We hope that those nuclear-weapon States which have not adhered to the protocols to the nuclear-free-zone treaty in our own region will soon find themselves able to do so.

The progress we are witnessing on these questions begs another. Is it not now time to begin in earnest the negotiation of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons? The CD's Ad Hoc Committee responsible for this subject has had a negotiating mandate for some years, regrettably without tangible result.

It is New Zealand's view that on legal and moral grounds all countries renouncing the nuclear option in an internationally and legally binding form and acting in full compliance with their obligations have a legitimate right to such assurances. Those recently extended to the Ukraine encourage us in the view that it should be possible in the new international climate to find a formula acceptable to all that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Naturally such an agreement will have to be based on mutual obligations by both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. We therefore believe that the multilateral framework provided by the CD offers the best environment for such negotiations.

Members of this Conference would be surprised if I did not now turn to another subject of particular interest to my country and, I expect, at least 22 others. New Zealand continues to hold firmly to the view that a sizeable and balanced expansion of its membership is required if the Conference is to fulfil the responsibilities entrusted to it by the international community.

When I addressed the opening meeting of the Conference in 1993 I put the case for an expansion which would take in all those countries wanting to contribute their perspective and resources to meeting the new security challenges of the 1990s and the twenty-first century. Many continue to share that preference.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

The intensive consultations conducted by Australian Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan in the following months convinced him, however, that such an option was not capable of attracting the support of all member States. The list he tabled in August last year therefore contained 23 new members, including New Zealand. It came so close to adoption that, I confess, we nearly drew the cork from the champagne bottle.

It was a great disappointment to my Government that the Conference was then, and still is unable to reach consensus on the fundamental question of its own composition.

While appreciative of the efforts that successive CD Presidents have since made to resolve this matter, and we welcome the appointment of a Friend of the Chair on this subject, Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil, I have to say that the Conference is causing a serious dilemma for countries such as my own. We want to play a full part in the CTBT negotiations and in all future negotiations undertaken by this body. We commit the resources necessary, both in terms of the contribution we make here in Geneva as a non-member delegation, and as a fully up-to-date fee-paying member of the United Nations which, as we all know, funds the CD.

I therefore urge the Conference to return to the proposal on the table and make determined efforts to secure its adoption. I am certain that the benefits of an early expansion will not be felt only by the new members, but will influence in a very positive way the effectiveness of the international community's single multilateral negotiating body.

Finally, Mr. President, in wishing you and your successors success in the many tasks before the Conference this year, let me also assure you of New Zealand's continuing commitment to its work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand for his important and comprehensive statement and for his good wishes addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ambassador Calovski.

Mr. CALOVSKI (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia): Mr. President, first I would like to join you in welcoming His Excellency the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, the Honourable Douglas Graham, for his important and very interesting statement.

Mr. President, may I, at the outset, express my delegation's satisfaction at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? I am sure that the Conference will be pleased with the deliberations under your presidency. You can count on my delegation's full support and cooperation. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky on his very important duty, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I am sure that the Conference will benefit from his

(Mr. Calovski, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

wealth of experience and diplomatic skill. We are very pleased to see the new Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, whose competence and devotion to the work of the Conference on Disarmament is very well known to all of us present here.

The impression of my delegation is that the Conference is proceeding with its work satisfactorily and one hopes that it would end up this year's deliberations with important results both from the point of view of its mandate as a negotiating body on disarmament but also from the point of view of the nature of its functions and deliberations - an important international forum which should positively influence the efforts of the international community aimed at the strengthening of international security. With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to mention the important and imaginative contribution of Mr. Gérard Errera, distinguished Ambassador of France, who succeeded in directing this year's session of the Conference towards useful and workable deliberations. That was possible because of the readiness and the ability of other participants to see the Conference continue with the productive experience gained when it succeeded in concluding the most important work of its negotiations so far - the chemical weapons Convention.

In the rich discussion at the plenary meetings of the CD and elsewhere so far we have noted the efforts of the participants to come up with workable suggestions which could be universally acceptable and we have also noted the echo of the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, to this Conference in which he emphasized that the end of bipolarity had not diminished, but rather increased the need for disarmament and that the disarmament process should be seen as an integral part of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and peace-building. So, from our point of view the CD is faced with an important task, to come up at the end of this year's deliberations with concrete results of the negotiations on very important instruments, which is also very important to positively influence the international efforts and the behaviour of all States towards achieving a better international security situation. We hope the CD will manage to do so. The quality of the results will depend on the readiness to sincerely respect international law, the principles and the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and to pursue international relations based on common interest, partnerships and mutual respect.

To my delegation the deliberations of the CD on all items of this year's agenda are very important. We would like to note with satisfaction the competence of the elected chairmen of the established committees. It is not, however, a surprise that the CD has shown the greatest interest in the work of the Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, chaired by the so much devoted diplomat to the cause of prohibiting all possible nuclear tests, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Marín Bosch. He has our full support.

Mr. President, from what I have said so far you could have noticed that my delegation is of the view that the process of disarmament can be useful and beneficial for the strengthening of international security and the improvement of international relations if it takes fully into account that negotiation of

(Mr. Calovski, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

an instrument has to achieve and serve global, regional and national purpose. The strength of the negotiated instrument will depend on the acceptability by all, recognizing that all States are equally interested, but that each State has its own preference. This is why the negotiations are usually very complex and why the consensus is not so easily reached. The huge difficulty which should be overcome in the process of negotiations is the question of confidence in the policy of other States which, we have to recognize that fact, is lacking at present; then the attempts to achieve something on the account of others which should not be permitted; and the behaviour to gain positions on the basis of strength which is contrary to international law.

My country, the Republic of Macedonia, attaches the greatest importance to the development of good-neighbourly relations and considers them most important generator for peace, security, cooperation and disarmament in our region, in Europe and also globally. By stressing the importance of this deterrent against all possible non-peaceful activities, we do not, of course, wish to undermine the importance of other factors favouring peace, security and development. But every day we are faced with invented, false examples of deeds and behaviour in international relations which are seriously threatening the peaceful development in the region of our country. To stop this unhealthy politics the international community must insist on the full observance of international law, should not allow unilateral actions in contradiction with purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and should take an active position against the breaches of international law.

It is true that in the period after the cold war we have entered unprepared, with so many wishes and expectations. The threat of the third world war with the use of nuclear armaments has been diminished, but many countries, as you all know, are continuing to be faced with the reality that they have to struggle daily with problems of their international security and the peaceful development of their region. Is the international community prepared and able to stop the present unhealthy developments in international relations? The answer should be of course a positive one. And there lies the problem, particularly from the point of view of countries like mine - the answer is always positive but the practice is full of negative developments. It is not enough to stress that we are entering the twenty-first century with a new world order. The most important is our attitude towards the international obligation, the character of our concrete behaviour and activities and, of course, our contribution towards the aim of sustainable peaceful development of international relations.

The example of my country in the process of acquiring its independence is characteristic from many points of view. We have invested huge efforts to acquire our independence peacefully, without a war, and to strengthen it with the development of international policy strictly in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. We have succeeded in that. If we had not succeeded, the international community, Europe would have been faced with a Balkan war much more tragic than one in Bosnia and Herzegovina that is unfortunately still going on in spite of so many efforts to stop it. The international community supported our platform, our policy of gaining our independence peacefully. My country

(Mr. Calovski, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

became a member of the United Nations and of other international organizations, we have established diplomatic relations with many countries, we have United Nations and United States peace-keeping forces with preventive functions and so on. All this in spite of constant, imaginable and elaborate obstacles by one of our neighbours which regretfully continues with its negative policy towards my country. The Government of Greece on 16 February 1994 decided to establish a full political and economic blockade against my country, the Republic of Macedonia, with the aim to destabilize it, thus endangering international peace and security in our region, in contradiction with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and many instruments of the CSCE including the Final Act of Helsinki and the Paris Charter. For this act the Government of Greece has been universally condemned by practically all countries including all 11 members of the European Union and by the United States. The European Union has instituted legal proceedings against Greece in the European Court. The right of land-locked countries to access to the sea, so many times reaffirmed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, has been violated and denied to my country by the Government of Greece. Can you imagine, Mr. President, what would have been the reaction in Europe if, for example, a similar decision as that of the Government of Greece of 16 February 1994 would have been taken by the Government of Italy, France or Germany against Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia or the Czech Republic as land-locked countries? Can Italy, France or Germany deny the right of access to the sea to Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia or the Czech Republic? Of course, they cannot and I am sure they will not. Then why has the Government of Greece been allowed to make such a brutal breach of international law? This precedent signals alarm for concern and should not be permitted to last. The international community has a duty to influence the Greek Government to annul without delay its decision of 16 February 1994 against my country.

We hope that the international community will continue to support our peaceful policy and that present difficulties created against us by our southern neighbour will soon disappear. Our policy as a European developing country in transition aims at our complete integration in Europe as soon as possible and development of good-neighbourly relations with all our neighbours. Of course with Greece too. Sooner or later we are bound to have good relations with Greece. We are ready to enter that period without further delay.

Since I am speaking about international peace and security, I would like to take this opportunity to stress that it is high time that all States should sincerely accept the so many times reaffirmed principle of interdependence and the policy to observe mutual interest, respect and partnership in international relations. Our resolute position against aggressions, against violations of human rights, against poverty, should be also very firm, against violations of the principle of interdependence and of mutual respect. That can be to a larger extent achieved by undertaking preventive and confidence-building measures in all fields of international cooperation.

(Mr. Calovski, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

It was in view of the current international political situation, very mature, that the CD decided to begin its work immediately on a nuclear test ban, prevention of an arms race in outer space, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and transparency in armaments. This was a very good answer to those that have expressed the opinion that the CD has reached the end of its usefulness after it completed the negotiation of the chemical Convention.

We share the position that all energy and negotiating skills should be employed in achieving agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, agreement which could be supported equally by nuclear and non-nuclear States, by big and small States. Most countries have no ambitions to become nuclear Powers but they accept the position that nuclear weapons are extremely dangerous, that they are a permanent threat to international security and that the best way to uphold non-proliferation is to ban all possible nuclear tests. We are aware of what is at stake and how complex it is to achieve a universally acceptable and verifiable nuclear-test-ban agreement which will annul the danger of nuclear war and will not pose obstacles to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The agreement should take fully into account the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the interest of all nations, big or small, developed or developing. In any case it would be a political agreement since it requires a political will and commitment to be achieved. Thus, it should be major instrument in strengthening international relations and a hope for better future of mankind.

The discussions so far in the CD and elsewhere once again confirm that peace and security are not threatened only by nuclear or chemical weapons. It is threatened by conventional weapons, much more than one can realize. We need no research to discover this. We see it every day on our television screen. The deliberations of the CD on transparency in armaments should lead the international community to conclude that an order in that field can be of great benefit to the efforts to improve the international political situation and to help finding solutions to so many war conflicts all over the world. The fact is that it is not necessary to have atomic bombs in order to frighten neighbouring countries. Modern conventional weapons are enough, particularly in our region. It is also a fact that it is not difficult to ascertain how much weaponry a country needs for legitimate purposes. But if a country accumulates huge quantities of conventional weapons, more than is reasonable, one should normally become worried. The rational policy which the CD in such a situation should advocate should be the development of good-neighbourly relations instead of an arms race in conventional weapons. I am saying this because the accumulation of conventional weapons in our region is something that the international community should be very much concerned with. Strengthening collective security could be one important answer to the need to stop the arms race in conventional weapons. We are witnessing dynamic efforts in various parts of the world, particularly in Europe, to see the collective security arrangement adapt itself to the new political reality. As we all know NATO is going through this process of transformation and one hopes that this will strengthen the power and dynamics of the forces for peace and

(Mr. Calovski, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

cooperation. The quality of the results will very much depend upon the readiness to uphold the vision that our future lies not in the arms race but in cooperation based on an equal footing.

The General Assembly of the United Nations at its forty-eighth session adopted without a vote resolution 48/84B on the development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States. Affirming its determination that all nations should live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, the General Assembly emphasized the urgency of the consolidation of the Balkans as a region of peace, security, stability and good-neighbourliness, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security and so enhancing the prospects for sustained development and prosperity for its peoples. Because of this attitude of the General Assembly this resolution was called the resolution of hope for the Balkans. By this resolution, the General Assembly, via the Secretary-General, requested, inter alia, of international organizations, as well as the competent organs of the United Nations, their views on the development of good-neighbourly relations in the Balkan region and on the measures and preventive activities aimed at creation of a stable zone of peace and cooperation in the Balkans by the year 2000. The report of the Secretary-General requested by this resolution will be discussed by the General Assembly at its fiftieth session. It goes without saying that the contribution of the CD on this subject will be very valuable and very important indeed. At present, we are witnessing many activities to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to promote peaceful alternatives. They deserve our full support. However, the international community should tackle this situation with greater vision, should see the forest instead of trees. Balkan States, with help and the necessary push by the international community, should start developing good-neighbourly relations among themselves. All other avenues will lead to more wars and confrontations which should not be allowed. The Balkans has gained the reputation as a region that permanently threatens international peace and security. We are firmly convinced that it is possible for the Balkans to become a zone of peace and development. My country will do its utmost to see in the future that kind of Balkans.

Before I finish my statement I would like to make a brief comment on the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Although regrettable it was not unexpected that the CD was not able to achieve consensus on the expansion of its membership. The Republic of Macedonia, as a successor State of former Yugoslavia, is very much interested in the resolution of this question. Like Croatia and Slovenia, we too are interested in membership. In our opinion, the CD should first resolve the dilemma whether it is realistic to continue to seek consensus on the expansion or whether it is perhaps better to try a new formula so that the CD could become a truly universal forum. Since we are seeking to conclude universally acceptable instruments it is worthwhile to try to solve the problem on that basis. Of course, it is easier to negotiate between two partners but since

(Mr. Calovski, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

the negotiations on such instruments as the ban on chemical weapons or the ban on nuclear tests, which as such are deterrents in favour of peace, why not try another avenue which will enable all interested States to participate in the negotiations? This would strengthen the confidence and the collective responsibility from which all States would benefit.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished delegate of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. May I ask if any other delegate wishes to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed according to actual needs, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see no request for the floor, so I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting.

Before adjourning this meeting I wish to remind you that it will be immediately followed by a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban here in this room. Therefore, those who are participating in the deliberations of this Ad Hoc Committee should stay in the room.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 26 May 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.679
26 May 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 May 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. György Boytha (Hungary)

GE.94-61773 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 679th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

This meeting, the last under my presidency, will be a short one as I have no speakers inscribed for today. None the less, I should like to ask if any delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage. This not being the case, I should like to make some closing remarks as Hungary's presidency comes to an end. Thereafter, I propose to take up for decision the request received from Spain to participate during the second part of the session in the work of the Conference.

It has become almost a tradition that outgoing Presidents offer a short summary to the Conference at the end of their tenure about their impressions and experience. I have to admit that Hungary took over the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in a very comfortable period. The substantive work of the Conference and its ad hoc committees commenced in a smooth and expeditious manner due to the efforts of my predecessors Ambassadors Hoffman and Errera, and the usually difficult chore of steering the process of report writing will be the responsibility of my successors. Nevertheless, even amongst such favourable circumstances we had to tackle a few problems. I would like to express my appreciation to all delegations, and especially the group coordinators and the representatives of China and Sweden, for the constructive approach they showed in addressing these issues. The Special Coordinator on "cut-off", Ambassador Shannon of Canada, is continuing his consultations and Ambassador Norberg of Sweden, the Special Coordinator on the review of the agenda, is going to report to the Conference in June. Friend of the Chair Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil intends to present a progress report on his consultations on the expansion of membership by the end of June.

On the substantive side, thanks to the efforts of all delegations, the work of the Conference has continued to run smoothly. The Conference is making remarkable progress in the field of the nuclear test ban, and exciting and forward-looking discussions can also be witnessed on nearly all other items on our agenda. I am convinced that these positive developments should give a definite answer to all the doubts and reservations questioning the Conference's ability to adapt the complex challenges of the changing international environment. It is this ability that should also help us in finding a solution for the long overdue issue of expanding the membership of the Conference. I have to take note with regret that the circumstances that influence the development of this subject have not yet changed to such an extent that would have allowed the Special Coordinator to report on substantial progress. I urge all delegations to find ways and means to overcome the remaining obstacles, and once again I would like to assure the next President of the Conference as well as Ambassador Lampreia of the full support and cooperation of the Hungarian delegation in his efforts.

This concludes my remarks at the end of the Hungarian presidency.

As announced, I would now like to invite the Conference to consider the request received from Spain to participate, during the second part of the

(The President)

session, in the work of the Conference. The secretariat has distributed today a note from the President containing this request (CD/WP.454). During the consultations I have been holding, there has been no objection to this request. In the circumstances, I propose that we adopt the recommendation contained in document CD/WP.454 directly in plenary, it being understood that this does not constitute a precedent for future occasions when an informal meeting might be necessary. May I take it that the Conference takes a decision to this effect?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. However, before adjourning this meeting I wish to remind all delegations that the deadline for submission of any changes and/or additions to the draft list of delegations accredited to the Conference on Disarmament, which was distributed at our last plenary, is 27 May. I would urge delegations to please respond without delay. In addition, I wish to remind you that this meeting will be immediately followed by a meeting of Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban here in this room, and I would also like to ask the Bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments to convene in adjacent room I for a short discussion, and I hope you will be able to be present at this meeting of the Bureau.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 2 June 1994 at 10 a.m. If there is no request for the floor, I declare the plenary meeting adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.680
2 June 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 June 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Satish Chandra (India)

GE.94-61966 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 680th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is both an honour and a privilege to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to assure you that I will do my utmost to serve the interests of the Conference in my capacity as President. I would also like to avail of this opportunity to thank my illustrious predecessors Ambassadors Errera, Hoffmann and Boytha who had presided over the Conference in an exemplary manner.

I would also like to take this occasion to congratulate Mr. Petrovsky for the assumption of the office of Secretary-General of the CD and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. My congratulations also go to Mr. Bensmail, who has long served this Conference with distinction and rightly deserves his appointment to the post of Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference. I would also like to welcome the new representatives of Algeria, Venezuela, Italy, Ethiopia and Australia.

The President of the Conference is naturally duty-bound to preside in an impartial and balanced manner, and that will be my endeavour. However, this does not prevent him for expressing the position of his own Government. I would therefore seek your indulgence at this stage in the proceedings to make a country statement on India's position on disarmament issues. This is all the more necessary as this is the first time that I would be speaking in plenary this year.

Nuclear issues fittingly occupy a place of pre-eminence in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. In this context, six years ago the then Prime Minister of India, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, presented to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament an action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order which is still relevant. The action plan is one of the most elaborate, consistent and coherent disarmament packages to be submitted to the United Nations. It contains a time-bound and phased programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It lays down obligations for all States - the two biggest military Powers, the other nuclear-weapon States, as well as non-nuclear-weapon States.

India's action plan, contained in document CD/859, was propounded at the closing stages of the cold war era. With the end of the cold war we have witnessed changes of seismic proportions in the international political and security environment which have led to new imperatives for the international disarmament and security agenda. Accordingly, nuclear deterrence has lost whatever value its proponents claimed for it and the massive nuclear arsenals of the major nuclear-weapon Powers make very little sense today.

It is, therefore, no surprise that significant strides have been made during the last few years in the field of nuclear disarmament. Thus many of the targets of the Indian action plan envisaged during the first phase, i.e. 1988 to 1994, have been attained. Apart from the far-reaching measures of arms reduction, both nuclear and conventional, a treaty banning chemical

(The President)

weapons has already been concluded. For the first time in 1994 the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament dealing with this subject has been given a negotiating mandate.

Hence 1994 is an immensely important year for the Conference on Disarmament. In this context, it is also not irrelevant to recall that the first initiative for a ban on nuclear tests was taken by India's first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, as early as 1954. It would be useful to reiterate that had the CTBT come into existence earlier, there would have been fewer and qualitatively inferior nuclear weapons in existence. We say this not to begin a litany of regrets but to impress upon the CD the urgency that must attend the task at hand. We have to be vigilant and careful that our efforts in this regard are not allowed to peter out into halfway or partial measures.

A CTBT has a very important place in the context of nuclear disarmament. It finds a place in the first stage of India's action plan for achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. We would at this stage like to comment on the following aspects of the proposed CTBT.

Firstly, structure and scope. The CTBT should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time. It should inhibit in a non-discriminatory way the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the horizontal as well as vertical dimensions. It cannot be conceived as an instrument designed to curtail technological progress or to perpetuate a division of the world into two categories of nations. We believe that no test should be carried out under the pretext of safety purposes. The ban should be comprehensive and not establish thresholds.

We support the idea of the closure of nuclear-weapon test sites. We believe that we have to be careful when approaching the idea of banning preparatory activities. Preparations which make a nuclear-weapon explosion imminent should certainly be within the scope of a CTBT; however, research and scientific activity related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be unnecessarily targeted. It is essential therefore to examine this aspect further and to work out a clear definition of preparatory activities that need to be covered.

Secondly, verification. As for the entire treaty, the verification system under a CTBT should also be universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and should guarantee equal access to all States. It should be internationally supervised and effective.

One of the most important requirements of a CTBT verification regime is that it should provide necessary confidence to States parties that nuclear explosions carried out in any environment will be detected, located and identified unambiguously in an appropriate time-frame, and thus deter any potential violator. Further, the system should be cost-effective so that the capital, operational and maintenance costs of the system do not result in an

(The President)

unreasonable burden to the concerned States parties. The cost-effectiveness and the degree of confidence provided by a typical verification system need to be optimized so that the CTBT can enjoy universal adherence.

We believe that seismic verification would form the core of a future verification system. India had participated in GSETT-1 and GSETT-2 experiments and has committed to participate in GSETT-3 also and encourages more countries to participate in it in order to make the CTBT an effective and technically verifiable treaty. We have also considered the utility of some non-seismic techniques such as radionuclides and perhaps hydroacoustic, but are yet to be convinced of other non-seismic methods. On-site inspections should only serve the purpose to cover the gaps left by these methods and should be taken only if there is a substantive suspicion of violation.

Thirdly, organization. We believe that a CTBT organization, preferably a separate specific organization, should serve the purpose of the implementation of the CTBT verification regime. The CTBT organization should have the capability of analysing and exchanging both international seismic data and other non-seismic data.

Fourthly, entry into force. We favour a CTBT which should attract universal adherence. Entry into force should not be complicated to delay the process. Entry into force should come into being once ratification has been effected by a reasonable and representative group of countries.

I would like to avail of this opportunity to thank Ambassador Bosch of Mexico for his leadership in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We look forward to his rolling text on a CTBT this month. Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinsky, the chairmen of working groups, also deserve our full support for their untiring efforts.

The issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is of great importance since it is linked to the fundamental security of all States. The delegation of India has consistently taken the position that the only credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. We however recognize that complete nuclear disarmament is a complex issue. Therefore, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is for the nuclear-weapon States to provide all security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an internationally and legally binding form, i.e. universal and without any qualification or discrimination. Therefore we favour an instrument based on the "common formula" approach. In first stage of our action plan, we advocated conclusion of a convention to outlaw the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending their elimination as a measure collateral to nuclear disarmament.

My delegation strongly supports the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Guillaume's efforts for progress in this field.

(The President)

India welcomes the progress achieved in the work related to transparency in armaments within the last year. Transparency in its various aspects will constitute an important CBM in mankind's progress towards international peace and security. However, it is necessary to remember that transparency is not an end in itself and cannot be a substitute for genuine disarmament measures which encompass nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. Transparency should be seen for what it is - a method for building confidence. To ensure that genuine confidence is engendered between sovereign States it is necessary to pause and consolidate our gains after this first year. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms which is the first such hesitant and yet encouraging step marks a good beginning in which 83 countries reported on arms transfers in 1993. At the same time, it highlights the potential pitfalls inherent in this exercise. There are obviously certain factors, either a lack of confidence or bureaucratic difficulties, which still inhibit the remaining countries, as only 45 per cent of the United Nations membership has responded. We need to make efforts to encourage universal adherence to the United Nations Register. Over-ambitious and hasty adjustments in the Register would tend to upset the delicate balance achieved in its genesis and would be counter-productive to our efforts to encourage universal adherence and simultaneity.

The complications in reporting to the United Nations Register are further apparent from the discrepancies in the information which has been received. For instance, out of 194 transfers reported, 159 relate to exports while 109 relate to imports. Of these, only 51 countries (26 per cent reflect a complete match; 16 transfers (8 per cent) have been reported by both parties though the number of items show a variance. These discrepancies should serve as warning posts to us that the process is not as simple as it may appear and considered and cautious progress must be recommended.

Genuine problems also exist on the question of increased transparency for transfer of high technology with military applications. India has developed considerable expertise in nuclear, space and missile-related technologies, but we have ensured that these technologies do not lead to proliferation. At the same time, we are against any ad hoc regimes or cartels which attempt to restrict access to high technology and believe that such measures can only lead to a new form of technological colonialism. Regimes like the MTCR and NSG are arbitrary, unequal and patently discriminatory. They need to be made transparent, non-discriminatory and equitable for it is only then that they will become universal and effective. These efforts must go hand in hand with greater cooperation in peaceful application of scientific and technological R & D in order to meet the goals of the emerging world order.

I would like to thank Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, Chairman of this Committee, and wish him all success in his work.

As co-sponsor of United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/74 A on prevention of an arms race in outer space we hope that the work of this Ad Hoc Committee will contribute significantly towards negotiation of a multilateral

(The President)

agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. We have noted the statements made by various delegations in this regard and would like to reiterate that confidence-building measures which play an important role in removing misconceptions and increasing trust cannot be substituted for genuine disarmament.

The existing space treaties are not entirely sufficient for prevention of an arms race in outer space and the objective of prevention of an arms race in outer space cannot be realized by filling the gaps in them. It would be necessary to evolve a fresh and comprehensive international treaty which should be legally enforceable on all States, specially the space Powers with military capabilities.

We fully support the Chairman of the Committee Ambassador Novoa of Cuba and his delegation in all their efforts for further progress.

India has for the first time co-sponsored the resolution on the cut-off of fissile material for weapon purposes and other explosive devices in the First Committee of the United Nations in 1993. A convention on "cut-off" should be non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated, internationally and effectively verifiable. We believe that the forum for negotiations on this issue should be the CD and an Ad Hoc Committee be set up to deal with it. The CD has the requisite experience and is best suited to the task. We also believe that the consensus resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly provides the basis for a mandate of such an Ad Hoc Committee. Following the agreement on scope, IAEA could be asked to provide a study regarding verification. The extent of verification would only be known once the scope of the convention has been determined. We believe that the production of fissile material for civilian purposes will be provided for and that this convention will not be applicable with retrospective effect.

I would like to extend full support to my Friend of the Chair Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil who has been entrusted with this valuable task on expansion of the CD membership. I fully support him in all his endeavours for a successful conclusion of his work. I look forward to his presentation of a progress report on his consultations by the end of this month. The expansion of the membership of the CD as proposed by the Special Coordinator last year is extremely important because a large number of countries are not represented in the CD who should become members at the earliest in order to contribute to the negotiations in the sole multilateral negotiating forum of the international community in the area of disarmament.

I would like to thank Ambassador Shannon of Canada, Special Coordinator for "cut-off" of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, for his report on consultations in the first part of the CD. I also wish all success to Ambassador Norberg of Sweden as Special Coordinator on the agenda in his endeavours.

(The President)

I would like to thank you, distinguished delegates, for listening to the Indian statement with patience and such great attention and I will now proceed with the rest of the meeting.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, Finland, Israel, the Islamic Republic of Iran, who will be speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, Brazil and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who will introduce the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group on its thirty-eighth session, which has been circulated as document CD/1253. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Norberg.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, before reading my statement, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the office of President of this Conference at this very crucial stage in our work, and I assure you that you can count on the full cooperation of my delegation.

Very valuable work has, during the last weeks, been accomplished in the Working Group on Verification of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, especially concerning the use of non-seismic verification techniques within a verification package for a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. The time has now come to be more specific about how we want to verify a CTBT. This is not to be a technological exercise, it is rather to find a balance between political and legal obligations, confidence-building measures and technical verification and on-site inspection arrangements. Our task is to find a balance that is acceptable to all of us. That has to be a balance that meets the security needs of all concerned, and we appreciate that those needs might be different for different countries. We are looking for verification arrangements that will develop and maintain the credibility of the treaty. We also want to create a cost-effective monitoring structure and one that is robust and does not by itself create numerous false alarms or other problems that might diminish confidence in the treaty.

In the view of my delegation we do have a good basis for our forthcoming deliberations. The Australian working paper on draft treaty elements (CD/NTB/WP.49) is an excellent compilation of old and new ideas. It constitutes, together with the Swedish draft treaty text, a good basis for our further consideration. A lot of other interesting papers have also been presented in the Working Group on Verification and a valuable compilation of non-seismic methods has been made by the Friends of the Chair. All this will enhance our common knowledge and facilitate our consideration.

In our draft treaty, contained in document CD/1232, we tried to reflect what we interpreted as commonly shared views and ideas. Now it is time for each country to be more specific about its needs and desires as to the requirements on the verification system and on its technical arrangements. We have noted with great interest that some delegations have already been fairly specific on their approaches.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

I will now try to be as specific on the Swedish verification requirements as is possible at this stage. In our view the verification arrangements should fulfil some basic criteria. They should, inter alia, help provide confidence that all parties abide by their treaty obligations; deter clandestine activities; be capable of detecting reasonable explosion scenarios in all environments; enhance confidence in the treaty and counteract false alarms; and provide treaty parties with information useful for national interpretation and assessment.

To meet those goals in a credible way, a verification system has to utilize a combination of different technologies. I will try to pinpoint those technologies that in our view seem most useful to satisfy our verification needs in a cost-effective manner. I will first turn to the technologies useful for monitoring underground explosions.

To provide assurance that no clandestine explosion is carried out underground, the treaty must, in our view, contain provisions for a seismological verification system with global coverage. The system designed and to some extent tested by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) is likely to fulfil those needs. In our draft treaty we have proposed that the verification agency is given authority over the Alpha stations, which are crucial for event detections. We believe that it is important not only for the credibility of the system but also for the smooth and cost-effective operation of the system that the agency has the authority to directly influence the technical equipment and the operation of the stations. To get a global system with stations at desired locations the costs of establishing and operating the stations have to be shared in a fair manner among the parties to the treaty. There might, as suggested in the Australian working paper, be different ways to ascertain the agency's authority and to achieve international funding. We are on our part quite open to different technical solutions.

The main difficulty with seismological observations is the large number of earthquakes that are being observed. The anticipated system might detect some 50,000 earthquakes each year. To maintain the credibility of the treaty it is in our view necessary to have provisions for on-site inspections to ascertain the nature of events that might not be confidently identified by observations at larger distances.

We must also find a pragmatic way of handling the large number of chemical explosions, most of them connected with mining activities, which will also be observed. We anticipate that some 3,000 such explosions each year are strong enough to be observed by the seismological system proposed by the GSE. We must handle these explosions without overly burdening the verification system or impeding the legitimate activities that generate those explosions, but at the same time ascertain that no clandestine activities are being conducted. In our draft treaty we suggest the possibility of declaring certain facilities as explosion sites and making them open to ad hoc inspections and we also suggested a scheme for reporting individual larger explosions outside such declared facilities. There might be other

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

possibilities, and we are eager to find cost-effective arrangements to ensure that these legitimate activities are not weakening the credibility of the treaty.

The availability of satellite images of an area prior to and after the occurrence of a seismic event might facilitate the interpretation of that event. Satellite images might also facilitate the planning of on-site inspections. The satellite images needed are available commercially today from SPOT and other similar systems. We therefore have an open mind on whether or not there is a need to make special provisions for such data in the treaty and if or to what extent the IDC should assist individual countries in analysing and making available such data.

Although the probability of observing radioactive noble gases from a clandestine underground test is low, we still think that such observations might enhance the credibility of the verification system and provide increased deterrence against clandestine activities. We therefore regard it as desirable to establish a capability to detect such gases worldwide in connection with the system to monitor airborne radioactive particles.

When it comes to possible clandestine explosions underwater in the deep oceans one may argue whether or not that is a likely threat scenario, but my delegation does not think it can be totally ruled out. Seismological observations are useful also for detection of underwater explosions, especially if they are conducted at great depths, when seismic signals are substantially stronger than for explosions of similar yield conducted underground. The seismological system is thus of great value for monitoring possible explosions also in the oceans.

Hydroacoustic observations are even more capable of detecting weak explosions in the water or at low altitudes above the water over large oceanic distances. In our view it would be highly desirable to include a system for hydroacoustic observations covering the deep oceans in the verification system. The hydroacoustic observations are quite similar to the seismological and could easily be integrated in the analysis together with the seismological data. Hydroacoustic observations will also greatly facilitate the identification of observed seismic events by differentiating between an underwater explosion and an earthquake occurring beneath the ocean floor. More than 70 per cent of all observed earthquakes occur beneath the oceans. This will in itself be a considerable achievement and greatly facilitate the interpretation of the seismological data.

Sophisticated hydroacoustic systems have been developed and established inter alia to detect and track submarines. Although Swedish experience is limited to the shallow waters of the Baltic, which is of no relevance in this context, it is our understanding that only a very small fraction of the capability and the instrumentation used for submarine detection is needed for the observation of explosions in this context. It might therefore be possible to utilize a small part of the already existing hydroacoustic observation systems around the oceans to provide hydroacoustic data to the verification

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

system. My delegation appreciates the United States offer to make available data from two hydrophone arrays in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans operated for other purposes. We urge other countries operating such systems to consider the "dual use" also of their facilities and thus make available part of the data collected and the station information needed to utilize these data.

As is well known there are no verification provisions in the partial test-ban treaty. To establish a credible CTBT verification regime the Swedish delegation, however, sees the need for verification arrangements that cover also explosions in the atmosphere. As presented in our draft treaty we would like to see a global system for the monitoring of airborne radioactive particles. We have in technical working papers described in considerable detail such a system containing some 100 globally distributed stations. A working paper presented during this session provides additional technical details especially on the design of automatic monitoring stations, which could be connected to the international data centre in the same way as the seismological stations. If there is general agreement, which we think there is, that a global system for monitoring radioactive particles in the atmosphere should be one of the elements of the verification system, then it is important that we form some sort of working group, including experts, to define and test such a system without further delay.

One of the limitations of a radioactivity monitoring system is the uncertainty of the location of the source. This is due to the uncertainties of estimating the path that the particles have taken from the source to the recording stations through the complex weather pattern. During the expert presentations in the Working Group on Verification several technologies have been discussed to enhance the capability of estimating a more precise location of a possible explosion in the atmosphere. We also see the need for improved capability to accurately locate possible atmospheric explosions. In our view the most rational and cost-effective way would be that countries that already today operate satellite-based detection equipment, sometimes referred to as "bhang-meters", would undertake to make information on and data from these systems available to the treaty parties. Data from such systems would in our understanding also be useful in monitoring possible explosions in outer space, although we do not see the conduct of such explosions as a very likely scenario.

We have also analysed acoustic methods, where we have many years of experience in Sweden, and ionospheric monitoring. We have found that although there might be situations where such observations may give a contribution, we do not feel that they on balance would significantly improve the verification capability. We therefore, from our perspective, see no need to have these technologies included in the verification package.

We see the need for an international data centre to collect and analyse data from the stations monitoring seismic signals, atmospheric radioactivity and possibly hydroacoustic signals and to distribute the results of its analysis to the treaty parties.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

There has been much discussion on the role of the IDC and on how extensive an analysis it shall carry out. Our view is that it is the responsibility of each State party to make the assessment and the identification of observed events and to determine if further action, for example a request for an on-site inspection, is deemed necessary. The IDC shall to the extent possible facilitate this assessment by providing States parties with compiled and analysed information based on data reported from the global networks of seismological, radiological and possibly hydroacoustic stations. The analyses shall be carried out according to agreed procedures designed to provide States parties with the most useful information. The IDC might also provide individual States parties with additional computations on demand. The products of the IDC merit further consideration and we will revert to this issue in further detail at a later occasion.

In this statement I have not specifically dwelt on the problems of costs but concentrated on the package of verification methods that from a Swedish perspective would be needed to adequately verify a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Of course we have to revert to the problems of costs. However, as a first step we have to define which verification package is needed to adequately verify a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The Swedish view on verification arrangements and technologies can thus be summarized as follows. We see a need for a global seismological monitoring system along the lines developed by GSE; a global system to monitor radioactive particles in the atmosphere; an international data centre to collect, analyse and provide information from the global monitoring systems; on-site inspection arrangements; and arrangements to confidently establish that large chemical explosions and sites for such explosions are not misused for clandestine activities.

It would in our view also be desirable to have a system for hydroacoustic observations based on existing recording stations; a global system to measure radioactive noble gases integrated with the system to monitor radioactive particles; and data made available from existing satellite-based sensors, "bhang-meters", to detect and locate explosions in the atmosphere and in outer space.

In addition, as a general rule, this verification package could and should be complemented by findings of national technical means, made available to the international organization.

We have found the expert presentations on verification measures in the Working Group of the nuclear-test-ban Committee most valuable. It is now important not to lose momentum, but rather increase the efforts to provide as solid a technical basis on the non-seismic techniques as we have on seismology thanks to the work of GSE and its global testing. We would therefore like to propose that such work, including testing, be initiated on radioactive and hydroacoustic monitoring with the aim of integrating also those techniques

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

into the international verification system. Such work has to be pursued hastily, so that a comprehensive test-ban treaty can be agreed on in the near future.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank Ambassador Norberg of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to Mr. Patokallio, the representative of Finland.

Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? I would like to assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation.

A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is a goal to which Finland has been committed for more than 30 years. We remain committed. Such a ban would be a further step towards nuclear disarmament. It would be of significant help in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A test-ban treaty would strengthen the international non-proliferation regime built around the non-proliferation Treaty. The conclusion of the test-ban treaty, or the imminent prospect thereof, would smooth the way toward the indefinite extension of the NPT next year, another goal to which my country attaches the utmost importance.

The first round of the test-ban negotiations was encouraging. With determination and with a keen eye for the essential the negotiations can be brought rapidly to a successful conclusion.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, has, with the able assistance of the working group chairmen, guided the work with a masterly hand. We look forward to more of the same on his part. It is our hope that he would present a complete draft treaty text before the summer break. The Australian draft, building as it does on the pioneering contribution of Sweden, already provides a solid basis.

On the basis of a Chairman's text, much of the drafting could be accomplished during the last round of this year's session. We are also in favour of continuing the work throughout the autumn, if so required. At the moment, it seems that inter-sessional work would be needed for the purpose of building the verification package for the Treaty.

It is important to maintain the present good atmosphere in the negotiations. The maintenance of testing moratoria is of great significance in this regard.

Like others, we have seen reports that China might conduct a nuclear test in the near future. We certainly hope that there is no substance to these reports. We urge China to join the moratoria and to refrain from testing.

A nuclear-test-ban treaty should ban nuclear test explosions. Full stop. That means no nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions,

(Mr. Patokallio, Finland)

ever, anywhere. The ban should leave no loophole whatever for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions - and I use the term "so-called" advisedly.

Nor do we believe that it is necessary or politic to try to define what constitutes a nuclear-test explosion. The concept is clear enough for arms control purposes. In our view, banning nuclear testing is one thing, banning nuclear weapons another. The one cannot bring about the other.

The test ban should become universal. In particular, it is important that all five nuclear-weapon States and other States with significant nuclear capabilities become parties to the Treaty from the very beginning.

However, we are not in favour of writing special categories of States into the treaty's provisions concerning its entry into force. Granting in effect the right of veto to some States could unduly delay the entry into force of the Treaty. The goal of universality would not be served thereby.

Our goal is an effectively verifiable treaty. The verification regime should give a sufficient guarantee, at a reasonable cost, of detecting activities that would represent a violation of the test ban.

The regime should be able to verify the absence of nuclear explosions in all environments, including in areas beyond the jurisdiction of any State. Verification should induce compliance with all the basic treaty obligations.

Seismic monitoring will be at the core of the verification regime. The work in this area is well advanced thanks to the long-standing efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts. Success with the experimental international seismic monitoring system will be an important step towards an operational monitoring network.

Finland will participate in the GSETT-3 experiment with a national data centre and a FINESS Alpha station. In addition, Finland is prepared to offer one or more Beta stations and to provide supplementary data through our national network. We urge all States involved in the CTBT negotiations to participate in GSETT-3.

We support the establishment of a global network to measure airborne radioactivity. We would be ready to participate in such a network. To the extent possible, the network should be built around existing national stations. It would be practical to make use of different technical solutions so long as they are capable of reaching the required level of performance. In our view, the network of stationary units should be complemented with portable ones. Portable units would make the network more effective and less cumbersome - less desk-bound if you will.

We support an international experiment concerning the functioning of a radionuclide network, involving also portable units.

(Mr. Patokallio, Finland)

In addition to seismic and radionuclide monitoring, it seems that hydroacoustic measurement would be a useful and cost-effective means of monitoring large ocean areas.

Naturally, we are prepared to look into other means of verification as well. We would not, however, like to see an overly elaborate and therefore costly verification regime. The aim is not perfection. The aim is to deter any nuclear-test explosions and to give adequate assurance of detection should deterrence fail.

For a small country with limited resources such as mine, it is important that the verification regime produces information in a compiled, digestible form. The prospective CTBT organization should be tasked to analyse the raw data for the benefit of all those States parties who so desire. Final judgement as to possible violations of treaty commitments would, of course, be up to the States parties.

Effective provisions for on-site inspections will be required for situations in which treaty compliance is in doubt. Inspections should be conducted by the CTBT organization at the request of any State party. During inspections, the organization should be able to use high-performance mobile units equipped, inter alia, for radionuclide measurement.

It is in the interests of all treaty-abiding States parties that an inspection is carried out quickly, unless the governing body of the CTBT organization determines that the request is patently unfounded.

In our view, the CTBT organization does not need a permanent corps of inspectors. However, a small group of experts within the organization could be designated in advance to assists in on-site activities and to perform additional measurements in areas beyond national jurisdiction or in the territory of a State party upon its request.

All in all, Finland supports an evolutionary approach to verification. As technology evolves, as it surely will, so should the tools of verification. Therefore, it would be practical to incorporate the details into a separate verification protocol which could be amended through a simple and expeditious procedure.

National technical means will be valuable in complementing the international verification regime, and should be recognized as such.

As to organization, Finland supports a close functional link to the International Atomic Energy Agency. A close interrelationship exists between test-ban verification and IAEA safeguards. Existing IAEA safeguards already provide a baseline for test-ban verification. Conversely, proposed elements of the CTBT verification regime, particularly radionuclide monitoring, can contribute to safeguard implementation.

(Mr. Patokallio, Finland)

In our view, a functional link between the two could best be secured through an arrangement whereby a small CTBT organization is co-located with IAEA in Vienna.

Finland also looks to the Conference on Disarmament on another nuclear issue, that of prohibition of fissile material production for nuclear weapons purposes.

We hope that the consultations of the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Shannon of Canada, lead to agreement on a negotiating mandate for a cut-off, preferably by the end of this round. A simple and straightforward mandate will do. It should focus on achieving quickly a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.

As a first step, the Conference could then proceed with the designation of a group of governmental experts. The group could provide its views on verification of the future treaty by the beginning of the next session, drawing as much as possible on the experience of IAEA. Actual negotiations could then begin early next year.

Whatever the option finally chosen with respect to verification of the cut-off, there is bound to be a close connection with IAEA. For reasons of competence, synergy and cost-effectiveness, our view is that verification of the cut-off treaty should be entrusted to IAEA.

Lastly, I would like to touch upon the issue of the composition of the conference.

Let me reiterate that we would be happy to go along with our own position of principle, that of opening up the Conference to all those States who apply for membership, if that solution were acceptable to all in the foreseeable future.

If not, we trust that Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil will be able to overcome the objections to the proposal presented last August by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia.

The decision is long overdue.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland, Mr. Patokallio, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Israel, Ambassador Lior.

Mr. LIOR (Israel): Mr. President, I would also like to first congratulate you on your assuming the presidency of the CD. We have no doubt that you will guide the Conference with great wisdom, and we are at your full disposal.

(Mr. Lior, Israel)

In speaking before the CD today I wish first to express my hope that in future Israel will be able to address this forum in the capacity of a full member.

I would like to focus very briefly on some aspects of a CTBT. As we clearly stated in our working paper submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban (circulated under CD/NTB/WP.72 on 26 May 1994), Israel supports the banning of nuclear-test explosions. It is within this context that Israel joined the consensus on the CTBT resolution at the forty-eighth United Nations General Assembly, and supports the negotiations conducted presently at the CD on concluding that treaty. Israel believes that the future CTBT should be effectively verifiable and attract universal adherence, and we intend to assist and contribute in the formation of the treaty.

It is our view that a well-defined scope, focusing on banning nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, would facilitate the acceptance of the treaty on a timely basis.

Israel supports the establishment of a verification regime aimed at assuring compliance with the CTBT. It should be dedicated to the monitoring, detection and identification of nuclear explosions without lending itself to abuse. Basically, the verification regime should comprise three elements: a global monitoring system, a non-routine event-triggered consultation and clarification process, and in rare cases - on-site inspection.

It is Israel's position that the prospective CTBT organization should be cost-effective, professional and impartial. Its structure should enable each State party to exercise its rights in the various organs, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis.

Israel supports a global and universally applicable CTBT. Such a treaty should also play a supportive role at the regional level. Israel expects all States of the Middle East to join the prospective CTBT as an important step towards regional stability and security.

Let me conclude by expressing the hope that the ongoing negotiations in the CD will produce a comprehensive test-ban treaty which will enable all States to join it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Lior of Israel for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Alaee.

Mr. ALAEE (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I am honoured to deliver the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21. I also express my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament.

During the first part of the 1994 CD session the Group of 21 agreed that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments address a

(Mr. Alaee, Islamic Republic of Iran)

communication, under his personal responsibility and without in any way binding the members of the Committee, to the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This communication would serve to inform that Group on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments during the early part of the 1994 session, so that this may be taken into account by the Group of Governmental Experts during its upcoming meeting.

It was further agreed that such a communication would have to be balanced, and to reflect fairly the various positions and trends in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Having had the opportunity to examine the letter drafted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, the Group of 21 felt that the letter did not present a balanced interpretation of the proceedings in the Ad Hoc Committee, and was therefore not in keeping with the understanding agreed to earlier.

The Group of 21 expressed its concerns to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments and proposed ways of resolving the problem, including the addition of one sentence to the letter stating that the Group of 21 considered the contents of the letter not to be balanced.

These concerns were not adequately dealt with in the letter and the Group of 21 therefore wishes to note that it does not consider that the letter sent by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments to the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms reflects in a fair and balanced manner the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments so far in 1994.

A copy of this statement will be sent to the Group of Governmental Experts so that it be taken into consideration by that Group.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil.

Mr. LAMPREIA (Brazil): Mr. President, may I begin by expressing my satisfaction and that of my delegation on seeing you assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? We are in very good hands, the hands of a seasoned professional of a distinguished member of one of the most respected diplomatic services in the world. We are, therefore, assured of a knowledgeable and refined stewardship. Let me also record our appreciation for the competent work done by Ambassador Boytha in his tenure as President.

I take the floor today to announce that on 30 May, the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Amorim, deposited the instrument of Brazil's ratification of the amendments to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) approved by its General Conference on 26 August 1992, and, at

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

the same time, made the declaration that Brazil waived the requirements for the Treaty's entry into force contained in its article 28 (a) and (d), thus giving full effect to the Treaty in Brazil. We have always felt bound morally by its undertaking. We are now juridically and politically committed.

It is particularly gratifying for Brazil to be able to fully accede to this Treaty, after being its original instigator, through a draft resolution proposing the denuclearization of Latin America presented to the United Nations on 15 November 1962, on the eve of the missile crisis that kept the world on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe in this far distant year. The full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Brazil represents the last step of a series of initiatives undertaken together with Argentina to consolidate both countries' commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. We have in past opportunities presented these initiatives in this forum. You are well aware of the characteristics of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I do not wish therefore to be repetitious, but please allow me to quote two passages from the statement of our Minister of External Relations. The first relates to the Treaty itself: "The Treaty of Taltelolco is, in many ways, emblematic of the international order that Brazil and the Latin American countries in general would like to see. It was born of an autochthonous, independent and pioneering impulse. It is a freely chosen regime, without impositions of any nature. For this reason it is a non-discriminatory and equitative Treaty, which establishes equivalent rights and obligations to all of its members, an essential condition for its acceptability to all participants."

The second quote from Ambassador Amorim relates to nuclear disarmament: "More than ever, Brazil and the other members of the Treaty of Tlatelolco have the right and the duty to engage ourselves in the promotion of a global process of disarmament. The logic of the cold war gave a doubtful and precarious argument to the balance of terror. The fact that it has been overcome makes the enormous nuclear arsenals yet in place still more irrational and intrinsically obsolete. It is up to countries such as ours, which have renounced such weapons and provided all possible verification guarantees of our commitments, to call for the nuclear Powers to make significant steps in the same direction, opening themselves to verification measures that retain the same multilateral and universal character. This process initiates its first steps with the negotiation of a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests in the Conference on Disarmament. It is our hope that present obstacles be quickly overcome so as to allow for progress in the complete elimination of the nuclear threat."

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil for his statement and for the very kind words that he addressed to me. I would now like to give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Dahlman, to introduce the Group's progress report on its thirty-eighth session.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I appreciate this opportunity to report to you on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group held about two months ago, from 21 to 25 March 1994, with the participation of experts and representatives from 23 countries. The progress report of the meeting is contained in document CD/1253, which is in front of you.

This session was convened following a request by the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to summarize the knowledge and experience on the upcoming GSE Third Technical Test (GSETT-3). The report more specifically was to elaborate on the overall concept of GSETT-3, the functions and components of the system, and matters of organization and cost.

The GSE report is contained in document CD/1254 and was introduced to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 24 March. In that connection experts from the GSE gave presentations, in their national capacities, to the Ad Hoc Committee's Working Group on Verification. The following presentations were made, as you may recall: Dr. Peter Basham (Canada) on seismic techniques, Dr. Frode Ringdahl (Norway), the Scientific Secretary of the Group, on the overall structure of GSETT-3, Dr. Steven Bratt (United States) on the International Data Centre and Dr. Heinrich Haak (Netherlands) on organization and cost. Although the report was thoroughly introduced and discussed some two months ago, it might be useful to briefly summarize its main conclusions to facilitate the forthcoming consideration of seismic verification techniques tomorrow in the nuclear test ban Committee's Working Group on Verification.

GSETT-3 is to be a realistic test on a global scale of a well-defined international seismic monitoring system. The system is based on a two-tiered network of more than 150 seismological Alpha and Beta stations. The Alpha stations, which are transmitting uninterrupted data on-line and with no time delay to the International Data Centre, would provide data for the detection and initial location of the seismic events. The Beta stations, from which data will be retrieved automatically by the IDC when needed, will be used primarily to improve location accuracy.

An Alpha network initially of 57 stations has been defined for GSETT-3 based on experience from earlier technical tests, extensive technical and scientific investigations and computer simulations. These stations have to meet specific requirements as given in the Group's report. The GSE has recommended that at least 100 Beta stations be included in the international seismic monitoring system. The technical requirements for the Beta stations might be less extensive than for the Alpha stations.

The 57 Alpha stations are distributed around the world in 34 countries. To date we have commitments from 13 countries for 21 stations. We still need 36 Alpha stations in 21 countries, and we also need about 100 Beta stations distributed all over the globe, and I again appeal to States to provide the required stations and other national facilities needed for GSETT-3.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The International Data Centre is the focal point of the international monitoring system, acting as a data collection, processing and distribution facility. It will receive and store large amounts of raw data and conduct extensive and well-specified analysis to define and locate seismic events worldwide. The information provided by the IDC to each participating State is thus an easily accessible synthesis of the reported station observations containing origin time, location, depth and size of all defined events. During GSETT-3 the International Data Centre will also compute and compile other parameters which may be useful for the identification of seismic events and provide those parameters to participants for national assessment.

The Group of Scientific Experts has accepted the kind offer by the United States to develop and host the experimental International Data Centre for GSETT-3 in Arlington, Virginia. The procedures used at this experimental IDC will follow, as far as possible, the procedures currently envisaged for the eventual IDC. The products and services provided by the experimental IDC will include an automatically produced list of all detected seismic events based on data from the Alpha stations. This list will be provided within one hour of the occurrence of the events. An amended list with improved event locations, obtained by automatic processing of data also from the Beta stations, will be provided within four hours so this is a very rapid process. A final bulletin, where qualified analysts have reviewed the data and the computations, will be provided within two days. The IDC will also provide a continuous assessment of the actual capability of the network and thus provide information on the weakest event that at any given moment can be detected in the various regions of the globe. To carry out its task during GSETT-3 it is planned that the IDC will have an international staff of 40 to 50 people.

The Group has conducted extensive theoretical studies of the projected detection capability of the station network to be used during GSETT-3. An example of such computations given in the Group's report shows 90 per cent detection thresholds from below magnitude 3 in parts of Europe and North America to above 3.4 in parts of the continents and above 3.8 in parts of the oceans in the southern hemisphere. Magnitude 3 corresponds to a threshold 10 times and magnitude 3.5 to a threshold 3 times lower than magnitude 4, and magnitude 4 is the seismic magnitude produced by a fully contained and coupled explosion in hard rock with a size of approximately one kiloton.

The GSE has also considered the important question of the accuracy of event locations. If the locations are based on observations primarily at large distances from the events, which is the case for the preliminary analysis based on Alpha stations only, then an uncertainty of the order of 20 kilometres might be expected. If stations closer to the event are added to the analysis - and this is the rationale for the Beta stations - then the location uncertainties may be reduced to some 5 kilometres. This is a reduction by a factor of 10 to 20 of the area within which an event can be found with a given probability. This is most significant when considering, for example, an on-site inspection.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

GSETT-3 is thus providing the definition and design of a station network and an International Data Centre that could provide a basis for the design of a seismic verification system. The detailed instructions and procedures developed for GSETT-3 could provide a good basis for operating manuals for the eventual system. The IDC, the seismological stations and other facilities which will be utilized during GSETT-3 would also provide valuable infrastructure and practical experience that could facilitate the implementation of an international seismic monitoring system under a treaty.

In its analysis of the cost of GSETT-3, the Group found that considerable investments have already been made in developing and establishing facilities to be used in the test. The total investments already made in seismological stations and the IDC are estimated to be about US$ 150 million, of which $120 million refers to stations and communications and $30 million to the IDC. The total remaining investments planned to be made in GSETT-3 facilities amount to $27 million. $19 million is planned for improving the station network and the communications and $8 million to finalize the experimental IDC. The annual operating cost for GSETT-3 is about $26-30 million. The cost of operating the Alpha network, the communications and the IDC are each about equal and amounts to $7-8 million per year, and the cost of operating the Beta stations is about half that amount.

This was an attempt to briefly summarize some of the conclusions of the GSE report CD/1254, which contains more information that might be useful in your consideration of the seismological part of the verification system.

During its March session the Ad Hoc Group also received and appreciated a briefing from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban Working Group on Verification. The Group also noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop in Tokyo, Japan, during 14 to 16 March 1994. Twenty-three experts from 21 countries attended the workshop, which contributed to the development of GSETT-3.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 8 to 19 August 1994, in Geneva. This session will be devoted to further planning and preparations essential for GSETT-3 and responding to requests from the Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Group on Verification for specific tasks of a technical and scientific nature.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Dahlman, for his report, and I would also like to draw attention to the point that he made about the Ad Hoc Group's suggestion that its next session be convened from 8 to 19 August 1994 in Geneva. You will notice also that the progress report in document CD/1253 contains, in paragraph 7, a specific recommendation to the same effect, namely, that the

(The President)

next session of the Group be convened from 8 to 19 August 1994 in Geneva. May I take it that these dates would be acceptable to the members of the Conference? This seems to be the case.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I would now like to give the floor to Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, allow me to join other delegations in congratulating you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial stage in our work and to assure you of our fullest cooperation.

We have all heard the statement delivered on behalf of the Group of 21 by the distinguished delegation of Iran, on the subject of the communication addressed by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, under his personal responsibility, to the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

My delegation subscribes fully to this statement of the Group of 21.

If I am taking the floor, it is to underline the fact that all our delegations attach signal importance to the principle of consensus which underlies all our actions and decisions in the Conference on Disarmament.

It is quite clear that a number of delegations had communicated to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, well in advance, that they considered his communication to be unbalanced in its interpretation of the proceedings in the Ad Hoc Committee, and that this needed to be duly rectified.

The fact that the communication was sent forward nevertheless by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, without due care having been taken to rectify it to the satisfaction of all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, is disturbing, and indicative of an absence of respect for their views.

What is even more disturbing is the fact that this type of procedural subterfuge should have been resorted to in a communication which reads like a report of an Ad Hoc Committee, and an unbalanced one at that in the view of many, without due discussion in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament. Had a discussion taken place in this forum before such a communication was sent, as would have been desirable, my delegation would certainly not have agreed to its transmission in the form in which it has been drafted.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to Ambassador Boytha of Hungary.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): Mr. President, first of all I should like to congratulate you for having undertaken the burden of presiding over the Conference. I should like to assure you of our cooperation and wish you success and personal satisfaction in your work.

Allow me to come back to two important statements which have just been made, one on behalf of the Group of 21, and the other on behalf of Pakistan.

I would come back to these statements not only because they were made on behalf of a group embracing a great number of our members. I will do so not only because these statements touched on an important question of procedure but also because they raise the respect for consensus and for the views of a great number of our member States. I should like to come back to these statements because they offer me an opportunity to first report to you on what happened in the context of the letter written by the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Register in New York, which has been referred to in our mandate and in the adopted programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. I should like to state first of all that the report on what has happened, as submitted by the distinguished representative of Iran, was correct. I only wish to add that it did not cover the entire process and that is what happened after the objections were raised by the distinguished representative of the Group of 21.

First of all, I wish to recall why this letter was sent to us and how we decided to respond to it under my personal responsibility rather than having a letter conceived jointly in the Ad Hoc Committee and have it sent via the President of the CD as a statement of the position of the Ad Hoc Committee itself.

In our mandate and adopted programme of work, it is stated that we have to bear in mind that the Secretary-General was requested by the United Nations General Assembly to report on the operation and possible development of the international Register of Conventional Arms and that the Secretary-General be assisted by a group of experts dealing with the Register and in doing so take account of the work done in the CD. The work related to this issue is being done in the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. So, I distributed a letter received from the Chairman of the Group of Experts working in New York on the Register in which he asked me to send an up-to-date report before the reconvening of that Group by the end of May, and not to rely merely on the earlier report submitted by the CD to New York. I distributed this letter as document CD/TIA/CRP.6 in the Committee, and then we discussed how to react to it. Many members were in favour of my proposal that we should do it on behalf of the Committee under the responsibility of all of us. However, this proposal did not reach consensus, and since we all are working on the basis of consensus, and I myself in particular respect this requirement, on a proposal submitted to us by the distinguished representative of the G.21 it was decided by consensus, that the letter should be written under my full responsibility without binding the Committee and that it should reflect the circumstances objectively and in a fair manner. Our adopted timetable was agreed upon so as to enable us to cover all aspects falling within the scope

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

of our mandate in the first two rounds of our discussions. Subsequently, my letter reflected what had been achieved so far, or what was my personal assessment of the work done in this first period of our meetings as of 20 May. The letter was immediately distributed for information, and not to share the burden of responsibility, which was imposed on my shoulders because it was agreed that it should be a personal assessment. I tried also to comply with the condition that it should be objective and reflect fairly all views proposed in the meeting. It was structured in such a way as to present contradictory or interfering views but reflecting everything which was available at that time. I only regretted that there were not many statements available on behalf of States forming part of the G.21. I did my best to comply with my task under the authorization received by way of consensus.

It is true that once I had distributed to all coordinators and members of our Bureau my personal assessment on what had happened, I received objections and further suggestions from the G.21 to further consider the issue. In order to get acquainted with the nature of the objections raised by the distinguished G.21, I postponed the sending of my letter. I invited the G.21 to put down in a working paper their views on substance and said that, as I had done with other papers already submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee, I would also mention that working paper in my letter, not as my personal view or assessment, but as reference material. Time was open to submit such a paper before my personal assessment was sent on 27 May, as I indicated in advance. Further to this suggestion, I visited a meeting of the G.21 where several members of the Group were present and where cooperation was offered to remedy the situation. At that time the request was put forward, as correctly stated by the distinguished representative of Iran, that I add to my letter the view that the G.21 considered my assessment unbalanced.

Since such a statement would have involved one group in conceiving a letter which I was authorized to send only in my personal capacity, I convened the Bureau and I asked the views of the Bureau members whether or not I should go ahead along the lines of what had been proposed by the G.21. Again, I wanted to act fully respecting the principle of consensus because this was a new proposal suggesting to involve a group of the Committee in drafting my personal letter, whereas my consensus authorization only entitled me to give a personal assessment. Secondly, I also wanted to express my full respect for the views expressed by the G.21 and that was the reason why I tabled them to the Bureau. No other member of the Bureau supported the inclusion in my personal letter of a view on this letter from a particular group in the Committee. Although there was no consensus reached, I none the less tried to take into consideration the objections and the suggestions tabled by the G.21, and I informed the Bureau that I would add to my letter a last paragraph in concluding my letter reiterating that this letter was written in my personal capacity, that it was not adopted by the Committee and that it did not necessarily reflect the views of any State or group of States participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. I did so not only in order to respect the principle of consensus and respect for the views of any member of our Conference, but also to keep in line with my authorization and to be helpful

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

to the New York-based Group of Experts which has the task of considering our work in assisting the Secretary-General to comply with the request addressed to him by the General Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank Ambassador Boytha of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I would now like to give the floor to Ambassador Ledogar of the United States.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, since this is the first time I am taking the floor under your presidency, allow me to congratulate you and to offer you the full support of my delegation and myself as you carry out your important duties.

I take the floor this morning on behalf of the 10 countries of the Western Group.

We wish to comment briefly on the letter dated 27 May 1994 sent by the Chairman of the transparency in armaments Ad Hoc Committee in reply to the letter sent by the Chairman of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts in New York on 11 February 1994. The Western Group does not understand the objections raised by G.21 delegations both in the Ad Hoc Committee on Tuesday 31 May and in plenary this morning.

The Western Group supported the suggestion of the Chairman of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee in February of this year that the Ad Hoc Committee attempt to draw up a consensus interim report to be sent to the United Nations experts' Group as part of the CD's contribution to the work of that group, taking note of United Nations resolution 46/36 L. Regrettably this suggestion did not meet with consensus. As a result, however, the Ad Hoc Committee did agree by consensus on the G.21 procedural solution that the Chairman of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee would send under his own responsibility a letter reflecting on the activity of the Committee thus far this year up to the end of May. As this fell within the procedural remit of the Chairman, the contents of the letter were not taken up for approval by the TIA Committee. As pointed out, the distinguished Ambassador from Hungary sent his letter on 27 May and kindly distributed its contents to all groups and observer delegations as a courtesy. The Western Group wishes to thank the Chairman for his efforts and for having taken on this additional burden to his already full role as Ad Hoc Committee Chairman. The TIA Chairman makes it quite clear in the body of the letter that he prepared it in his personal capacity and that it was not adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee. The letter is therefore not binding on any delegation of this Conference, including not binding any delegation of the Western Group.

The Western Group is disappointed that this procedural issue has been brought to the plenary, and we hope that we can soon press on with substantive TIA issues.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Ledogar of the United States for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to Ambassador Dobrev of Bulgaria.

Mr. DOBREV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, may I, at the outset, join previous speakers in expressing my delegation's satisfaction at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference? Let me assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation.

I have asked for the floor as Coordinator of the Eastern European Group to express our position on the letter written by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA in reply to the letter of the Chairman of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts. The Eastern Group finds it difficult to agree with the views presented today by the distinguished representative of Iran on behalf of the Group of 21 on this subject. It is our belief that the Chairman of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Boytha, has acted in full conformity with the consensus reached in the Ad Hoc Committee earlier this year entrusting him with the task to send, in his personal capacity, a letter summarizing the activity of the Committee by the end of May. We consider this letter written under the responsibility of the Chairman of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee as not binding on any delegation or regional group of this Conference.

In conclusion, the Eastern Group hopes that the remaining part of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee meetings would be used effectively in discussing substantive issues and we expect those discussions to be properly reflected in the final report at the end of this year's session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Dobrev for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Ambassador Neagu of Romania.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, may I first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial juncture of the debates in the Conference? I want to assure you of the full cooperation and support of the Romanian delegation.

I listened very carefully to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who presented a statement of the Group of 21 on the letter sent by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA to the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, as well as the explanations presented by Ambassador György Boytha in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA, and the statements made on the subject by other distinguished ambassadors.

May I confirm what my deputy, Mr. Rosu, said on the subject at our previous meeting? My delegation considers that the Chairman of the TIA Committee, Ambassador Boytha, had not only the liberty, but also the duty as Chairman of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee, to inform the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts about the proceedings in the Ad Hoc Committee. As has been underlined by several other speakers, Ambassador Boytha acted in full conformity, in our opinion, with the agreement reached in the Ad Hoc Committee earlier this year. In the situation where one could not agree on a consensus

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

text communication on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee, the only possibility which remained was to send a personal letter which is not binding on any delegation, but only the Chairman, and this was the agreement in the Committee. Meantime, we considered that the text itself of the letter was balanced and objective. Bearing in mind these considerations, I appreciate that the criticism is a little bit unfair, the Chairman's communication having been in full accordance with the duties of the Chairman.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Neagu for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Ambassador Norberg of Sweden.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): With respect to the question of the letter from Ambassador Boytha to the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Ambassador Wagenmakers, I would like to say the following. My delegation regrets the fact that no consensus could be reached at the outset of this year's session with regard to an interim report from the Ad Hoc Committee to the United Nations Group of Experts. My delegation notes, however, that the consensus decision was taken according to which the Chairman as a compromise solution would transmit the report to the expert Group. He would do so under his own responsibility and in no way binding on the Committee and its members. It was to be his own assessment of the work of the Committee. It seems to us that in preparing and sending the letter in question to Ambassador Wagenmakers, the Chairman of the Ac Hoc Committee discharged the duty entrusted to him. It should be noted that the content of the letter represents only the Chairman's own assessment of the work carried out in the Committee, and again, it is not binding on the Committee and its members. My delegation, therefore, associates itself with the views expressed by the distinguished representatives of the United States on behalf of the Western Group, of Bulgaria on behalf of the Eastern European Group, and my distinguished colleague from Romania.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Sir, allow me to congratulate you on the responsibility you have taken up at this Conference and to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Boytha, for the work he accomplished.

I would like to refer to the point we are discussing. In recent days, during the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the subject of transparency in armaments, my delegation, along with another group of delegations, referred in one way or another to the matter we are addressing and demonstrated in their statements their disagreement with the procedure followed in the dispatch of the letter from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to the Group of Experts which is currently meeting in New York. I do not think it is necessary to repeat here what all the distinguished representatives know only too well, that a personal letter from a person in a public position is not such a personal letter as might at first appear. We have had, and this is not the first time that we have taken upon ourselves an exercise of this kind, and this delegation recalls having seen and discussed more than three revised versions of a single personal letter, until the text secured the consensus

(Mrs. Bauta Soles, Cuba)

necessary for it to be sent outside the Committee on Disarmament. What I am trying to say is that it has never been considered in this forum that a personal letter from a diplomat occupying a public position is equivalent to a blank cheque. The statement that was unanimously - I emphasize, unanimously - agreed by the Group of 21 on this matter and was read out here this morning by the distinguished representative of Iran reflects the same disagreement of this group of delegations that had already been voiced in the work and in the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee. It is true, as Ambassador Boytha said, that this statement does not cover all the aspects that are relevant to this particular issue. For various reasons, this statement does not refer to real facts that before this letter was sent, there was opposition formally presented by one delegation which informed the President of the Conference that it objected to the sending of the letter as it stood at that moment. In the view of our delegation the fact that this action was ignored is a serious matter. For our part, we consider, and it is for that reason that we consider, and in addition we would like to place on record our position in this room, that nothing justifies the procedure that was followed in communicating with the Group of Experts in New York. The key to success in our work lies in ensuring the most scrupulous respect for our rules of procedure and in particular the rules of consensus. Everything that departs from this principle can only bode ill for this Conference. We not only regret the fact that this matter is taking up time and has come up here and is taking up time in our work, but it is no accident that this should happen - it was prompted by a very specific cause and it would seem to be that cause which we should regret and which should in the final analysis have been avoided. Lastly, I would like to say that my delegation welcomes the general recognition in this room that the document sent to the Group of Experts in New York is not binding on any of the delegations represented here.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I would like to thank you and at the same time express to you our sincere greetings and esteem on your assumption of the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to thank you and express our deep appreciation to you personally as the distinguished representative of a great country, India, which is a leader of the third world and of the Non-Aligned Movement and has participated with Egypt and other countries of the third world in establishing the foundations of the Non-Aligned Movement which is meeting today and throughout the current week in Cairo at Foreign Minister level. That meeting will be discussing, inter alia, those questions which we are considering in the Conference on Disarmament. Since Egypt is the host country for that meeting, I promise you that, once the Cairo meeting is concluded, I will transmit to the Conference on Disarmament the details of the conclusions reached by the Non-Aligned Movement's conference held in Cairo in so far as they relate to the issues that we are discussing here.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

I also wish to express appreciation to His Excellency Ambassador Boytha, the representative of Hungary, for his able guidance of the work of the Conference before you, Sir.

Concerning the question that has been raised and which has been reflected in the statement delivered by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Group of 21, the delegation of Egypt fully concurs with the letter and spirit of the content of that statement. Egypt has a special responsibility in this regard because it has been selected as coordinator of the Group of 21 for the item related to transparency in armaments. After the statements that we have heard, I would like to point out that we have adopted a position which we have already explained concerning the dispatch of a letter from the Chairman of the Committee to the Chairman of the Group of Experts in New York on that particular question. It is untrue that Egypt, while participating in the work of the Group of Experts held in New York, agreed to the dispatch of a letter from the Chairman of the Committee on Transparency in Armaments to the Group of Experts in New York. Egypt did not want that and what has been said on that particular subject is incorrect. Even if that had happened, the meeting that was held in New York by the Group of Experts was one in which experts participated in their individual capacities and not as representatives of Governments.

Egypt has adopted that position of not agreeing to dispatch the letter to the Chairman of the Group of Experts because it is committed to objectivity, as we have stated in the Committee on Transparency in Armaments. We said that if we reach the second part of the Conference on Disarmament by the end of the month of May, the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament on the item concerning transparency in armaments would be incomplete. If we then put on record that progress had been made in the deliberations as of the end of May, our report would be unfinished and would give an incorrect and an incomplete picture of the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament on transparency in armaments. We therefore adopted that position to the effect that we do not agree to the dispatch of that letter by the Chairman of the Committee on Transparency in Armaments to the Group of Experts in New York and that the reports of the Conference on that item for the years 1992 and 1993 should suffice since those two reports reflect the deliberations at two full sessions concerning the item of transparency in armaments. However, there was a consensus on the dispatch of that letter on the understanding that it would reflect Egypt's position, taking into consideration what I have already explained: firstly, that the letter would be the personal responsibility of the Chairman; secondly, that it would not bind the Committee; and thirdly, that the letter should be balanced, objective, just and equitable, that is to say it should be equitable in regard to all members of the Conference on Disarmament and not solely to one or two groups. Therefore, I am now wondering what would be the use of sending a letter from the Chairman of the Committee on Transparency in Armaments on his personal responsibility. Could that letter be sent in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee?

That question has raised a number of queries. What value would be attached to it by the experts who are considering the expansion of the

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Register? What are they going to understand from a letter drafted on the personal responsibility of a representative of a particular country if the representative of that country happens to be the Chairman of the Committee? The letter should reflect all the positions expressed during the deliberations and not the positions of only one or two groups to the exclusion of a third. Therefore, if the letter is not binding then what is the use of such a letter to the Group of Experts when they discuss the expansion of the United Nations Register?

The Group of 21, within the context of the work of the Committee on Transparency in Armaments, has made a number of declarations reflecting positions which, had they been taken into consideration, could have added an important element to that letter, namely the element of balance, objectivity and equity. Therefore, since Egypt is responsible for coordination within the Group of 21 on the item of transparency in armaments, I felt it appropriate to dot the i's and cross the t's.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Mounir Zahran for his statement and for the very kind words addressed by him to my country and myself. I now give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador Hou of China.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): In view of the late hour I had not intended to take the floor, nor do I want to prolong the lengthy debate today. However, I would like to make a very brief statement. Mainly I would like to take this opportunity to extend to you, Mr. President, the warm congratulations of the Chinese delegation. I would like to let you know how pleased I am to see the representative of great India taking up the Chair here. The Chinese delegation would like to assure you of our most constructive cooperation.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments is an important ad hoc committee of this Conference. The Chinese delegation has taken an active part in its work. Just now we have listened with great attention to the statement of the Group of 21 as well as the statements of certain members of the Group of 21. At the same time we have taken note of the fact that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA, Ambassador Boytha, has expressed the view that in the absence of a consensus he has despatched a communication as a private communication which does not represent any group and any delegation nor does it represent the entire Conference. Therefore his communication has no binding force whatsoever on any one of us. At the same time I would like to state that the Conference and all its ad hoc committees abide strictly by the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament. Here let me quote rule 11 in section IV: "Apart from exercising the normal functions of a presiding officer and in addition to the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the President shall, in full consultation with the Conference and under its authority, represent it in its relations with States, with the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations and with other international organizations." I think this important procedure also applies to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. It is the view of the Chinese delegation that the despatch of a personal letter by the Chairman of the

(Mr. Hou, China)

Ad Hoc Committee on TIA has no precedent and should not constitute one in the future. Of course, every country and every member separately, or every group individually, can decide what they want to do or what they do not want to do, and there is no necessity to use the capacity of President of the Conference. At the same time the Chinese delegation would like to stress one point, namely that each delegation, including the Chinese delegation, should with appropriate means safeguard the unique position of the Conference as well as its unique function and power. Our organization in a certain sense, as certain delegates have stressed, is an autonomous negotiating body. Each year with consensus we only submit one report to the General Assembly. We have no other reports nor do we report to any other organizations. Of course, any other organization regardless of whether it is an NGO or a non-NGO has no right to intervene or to review our work, nor are we obligated to report to them. As to the expert groups of the United Nations, of course they have their own importance regardless of how many members there are or how important they are; there is no direct obligation for the Conference to report to them. I do not want to further prolong our discussions today.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank Ambassador Hou for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

At this stage, if I may be permitted, just to make a couple of observations and then, of course, if anyone wishes to speak, he will have the floor. I just want to say that it is unfortunate that this issue could not be more smoothly resolved. I think we have heard all sides of the issue. Actions have been taken; a letter has been sent by Ambassador Boytha; the Group of 21 has indicated what it will do; we have had as many as nine speakers already who have addressed this issue at length and I don't know what more can be achieved on this particular item. Several important points have been raised, but certainly if it is felt that more debate is needed on this, I will be very happy to give the floor to any other speaker who wishes to address the issue. Ambassador Ledogar of the United States has the floor.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Yes, we have heard quite a bit, but we have not come to the real issues I'm afraid, and maybe it's time we did.

I apologise for taking the floor again and would like to clarify that this time I am speaking in my national capacity. We have listened to the representative of the G.21 this morning and I also attended last Thursday's meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee's Bureau and I remained bewildered with the argumentation that has been put forward with regard to the Chairman's letter in question. To say that the Chairman's letter is unbalanced implies that one could offer substance to establish or re-establish the balance but that one was ignored or inhibited. In other words, this "unbalanced" charge supposes that the delegations who are so upset with the Chairman's letter have attended the meetings; that these same delegations have participated in the debates and the discussions related to the TIA's programme of work and timetable of meetings; that delegations have taken the step of presenting proposals or, better yet, in accordance with the TIA mandate, have elaborated universal and

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

non-discriminatory practical means to increase the openness and transparency related to the various TIA topics at hand, like military holdings and procurement through national production. I think that the record speaks for itself. The Chairman provided his assessment of the TIA activity to date for the 1994 session, not for the 1993 session. Only a handful of G.21 delegations have presented this year their views, either in CD plenary or in the TIA Ad Hoc Committee itself, and even fewer delegations have suggested practical means for contributing to the Committee's TIA work. We all know that the root of the concern voiced here this morning is that some delegations in this Chamber still have a problem with the concept of transparency and openness in military matters and are unable and unwilling to commit to such useful goals. The United States regrets the reluctance to discuss in the CD what is really important in the world today - the excessive and destabilizing build-up of conventional arms. History shows that conventional weapons are responsible for thousands of times more deaths than nuclear weapons, and our world today is facing numerous confrontations based on conventional arms, not nuclear arms. The TIA Ad Hoc Committee had a chance, as a Committee, to draft an interim report to the Group of Governmental Experts; such a process would have created a deliberation in the Committee; all delegations could have presented views; the report would have been drafted by consensus, but the G.21 was instrumental in preventing such an option.

I hope we can quickly put aside this non-issue and refrain from intemperate charges such as the charge of procedural subterfuge or the abuse of blank cheques. The United States hopes that those delegations which have committed so much time and emotion to this non-issue can show the same type of effort and enthusiasm to the important work of the Committee.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): I am sorry that I am asking for the floor once again on this particular issue in order to make brief comments on two points. First point: with regard to what has been said about the inability of the Group of 21 to add something that could make the letter sent by the Chairman of the Committee more balanced, that statement is unfortunately incorrect because we tried that but the Chairman of the Committee said that the letter was his personal responsibility. He therefore did not accept any amendment to that letter in order to make it more balanced. Second point: I really believe that there are States which participate in the Conference and which do not wish for full transparency. This is proved in two ways. Firstly, we requested the expansion of the Register to include more than seven categories of conventional weapons, but those States did not want the Register to reflect holdings, procurement and sales of all categories of conventional weapons the excessive stockpiling of which is deemed to constitute a threat to international peace and security in so far as it constitutes an early warning to the effect that there is a grave danger threatening international peace and security. The other category comprises weapons of mass destruction. If we say that the Register does not include weapons of mass destruction then the Register does not really reflect transparency because weapons of mass destruction by their very nature are considered excessive and are considered exaggerated inasmuch as they can pose

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

a threat to international peace and security. For these reasons we fully agree with the statement to the effect that there are some States which do not want that Register to be a full reflection of transparency.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Very briefly, my delegation merely wishes on this occasion to place on record our regret at the obvious insufficiency of the information that has been given by His Excellency Ambassador Ledogar of the delegation of the United States with regard to the participation of the delegations of the Group of 21 in the work of the Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Absolutely all the positions of the Group of 21 have been put forward on the principal issues encompassed by this subject area. It is for this very reason that there is no consensus on the entire quantity of matters on which we would have liked there to be consensus at this level. I conclude my statement by stating that quantity does not necessarily mean quality and this could very well be applied to certain contributions to the work of the transparency Committee

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for her statement and before I give the floor to Ambassador Kamal and thereafter to Ambassador Boytha, I would just like to repeat what I said earlier, which is that there are obviously persisting differences on this item and differing perceptions, and I think it is not worthwhile wasting more time on this, and some speakers have said as much earlier that we have, I think, heard several sides on this and it is probably not a useful utilization of time to spend it on this subject. But I am in your hands, and I give the floor to Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I will be brief. I too, like others, have heard all the statements pronounced here today and am happy to see that some of my own earlier words have been so carefully registered and recorded. Each one of us here has a point of view; some as big brothers, some as younger brothers, and while we frequently agree, we sometimes do not. As you yourself have stated, Mr. President, the point here is that it is quite clear that consensus did not and does not exist. Damage has, therefore, been done to the dignity of this body and to the sanctity of its rules of procedure by the letter sent out by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): Just a very short statement in order to avoid misunderstandings. I think that in the light of our discussions, it can be stated that I, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, did not refuse to add substance to this letter. I invited the Group of 21 to prepare a working paper, but it was said that it was difficult to do so in such a short time. What was available had been reflected in the letter. So, for instance, to add additional categories to the Register introducing a rubric for weapons of mass destruction and also other available material, has been duly reflected in that paper.

I fully agree with the general view that no Committee and no body should request the President to act in his own capacity and without the support and joint work of his or her Committee. Unfortunately, that was not the case

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

this time. My original proposal was to have a joint letter elaborated and this proposal of mine was shared by some of the Committee members but, unfortunately, no consensus was reached and we have to respect first of all the fundamental principle of consensus.

My last remark is that, in spite of all these problems this procedure has caused, we should now concentrate on substantive work on TIA; we still have a number of meetings ahead of us, but not many. As to the question - What does it mean that the Chairman's letter does not bind the Committee? - it means that we have to work now, irrespective of my letter, on the substance of our report to the Conference and this report will then be submitted to the General Assembly. This is our task and when doing so, I firmly count on the cooperation of all members of the Ad Hoc Committee of all groups, and I hope for more intensive participation in the discussions, also on the part of the Group of 21. I thank you for that in advance.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, I apologise for taking the floor at this late hour, so I will omit my congratulatory words to you and pass immediately to business. I listened with great interest to the statement made by Dr. Dahlman on the progress of GSE. He gave very concrete figures on the detection capability of the seismic network which the GSE is now developing, and I know that some of these technical questions are to be dealt with in the verification Working Group of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. I wish to take advantage of the presence of Dr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the GSE, to give some expert advice. He gave very concrete figures on the detection capability of the seismic stations, but all these figures are on the assumption that the explosion takes place in a fully contained and coupled explosion in hard rock, and what I would like to know is if there is any formula with which we can translate this into finding out the detection capability of the same network if the explosion takes place under water. We would like to know if such an automatic formula exists and if not, we would like to know how easy or difficult it is to evaluate the detection capability of your seismic network for underground explosions. As we are discussing non-seismic verification technologies and the decision-making week is approaching, it is very important to hear the views of a seismologist on this evaluation and, should you find it difficult to reply at present, we would be glad if you could brief us during one of the verification working groups this week.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Japan for the points made by him and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, and I now give the floor to Dr. Dahlman to answer the queries put to him.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): The figures I quoted in my introduction of the progress report are taken from the report prepared by the Group of Scientific Experts. There have been discussions on detection capabilities in the Group of Scientific Experts, but at this moment we do not have any particular consensus on the formulas to be used to transfer this capability defined in hard rock into other materials. I think various delegations may have somewhat different views, and I would be happy to discuss this issue with you but not as the Chairman of the Expert Group.

Mr. KELLER (Germany): I apologise for taking the floor at this late hour, but I am forced to do so because the envisaged meeting of Working Group 1 of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee after the plenary unfortunately will not take place. After consultations with our two Friends of the Chair from India and the Russian Federation, I would now like to make the following announcement regarding tomorrow's timetable. As foreseen, there will be a seismic session at 10 a.m. which will be continued in the afternoon and immediately afterwards we will switch over to our Friend of the Chair from the Russian Federation to give him time to accomplish and complete his session as far as on-site inspection is concerned. So I would ask the experts who are likely to have any sort of presentation tomorrow afternoon to be present at that late hour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for the announcement that he has made. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I would now like to turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I would request that we adopt it. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes the main business for today, and if no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I would just like to make a couple of announcements. Firstly, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances wishes to confirm that this afternoon's meeting will indeed be held in the Council Chamber as envisaged in the timetable of meetings for this week. Secondly, as you are aware, starting this afternoon at 3 p.m. and tomorrow Friday all day, high-level meetings on the former Yugoslavia will be held in the vicinity of the Council Chamber. In view of the exceptional security arrangements which will be in force, I would urge all delegations to wear their identification badges and to please follow the directions given by security personnel for access to the Council Chamber. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated by the secretariat.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held as scheduled on Thursday, 9 June 1994, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.